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Abstract
In multi-issue allocation situations we have to divide a resource among a group
of agents. The claim of each agent is a vector specifying the amount claimed by each
agent on each issue. We present an axiomatic characterization of the proportional
rule.
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1 Introduction
In bankruptcy situations a resource must be divided among several claimants. The prob-
lem arises when the resource is not suﬃcient to cover all claims. A typical example is
when a ﬁrm goes bankrupt. The objective is to identify well-behaved rules for dividing
the resource among agents. The literature devoted to the formal analysis of bankruptcy
problems originates in a paper by O’Neill [9]. See Thomson [10] for a survey.
In bankruptcy situations the claim of each agent is a number. However, there are many
real-world situations where the resource must be divided not on the basis of a single claim
for each agent, but several claims related to diﬀerent issues. These kind of problems are
called multi-issue allocation (푀퐼퐴) situations and were introduced in Calleja 푒푡 푎푙 [2].
∗Corresponding author. Name: Gustavo Bergantin˜os. E-mail: gbergant@uvigo.es. Postal address:
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Lorenzo-Freire 푒푡 푎푙 [7], Moreno-Ternero [8], Gonza´lez-Alco´n 푒푡 푎푙 [4], Lorenzo-Freire 푒푡 푎푙
[6], Ju 푒푡 푎푙 [5], and Bergantin˜os 푒푡 푎푙 [1] also study 푀퐼퐴 situations.
Here is a concrete example. In most Spanish Universities, once the total annual oper-
ating budget for issues is decided, it is the responsibility of the senior administrators of
each department to decide how much is allocated to each issue, such as research, teaching,
.... and submit a quantiﬁed request. Once the issue allocations are ﬁnalized, the univer-
sity compiles the university’s annual operating budget and each department is notiﬁed
of the amount assigned to each issue. Other examples are: The European Community
who distributes its budget among several issues (agriculture, roads, research, ...) and each
member state (Spain, France, ....) makes a claim for each issue. The Spanish government
divides the budget among several issues (health, education, ...) and each autonomous
region (Galicia, Madrid, Catalonia, ....) makes a claim for each issue. The government
of Galicia divides its budget among several issues (roads, education, ...) and each City
Council (Vigo, Santiago de Compostela, ....) makes a claim for each issue.
All these situations can be modeled as a 4-tuple (푅,푁,퐸, (푐푘푖)푘∈푅,푖∈푁) where 푅 is the
set of issues (research, teaching, ... in the university example), 푁 is the set of agents (the
departments), 퐸 is the resource (the amount the university has decided to assign to all
the departments), and 푐푘푖 is the claim of agent 푖 on issue 푘.
In bankruptcy a rule is a vector (푓푖)푖∈푁 where 푓푖 is the amount assigned to agent
푖. In multi-issue allocation situations, two approaches are possible. Approach 1: as in
bankruptcy, a rule is a vector (푓푖)푖∈푁 where 푓푖 is the amount assigned to agent 푖. It is
followed in Calleja 푒푡 푎푙 [2], Gonza´lez-Alco´n 푒푡 푎푙 [4], and Ju 푒푡 푎푙 [5].
Approach 2: we ﬁrst divide the budget among the issues. In a second step, the amount
assigned to each issue is divided among the agents. Here a rule is a matrix (푓푘푖)푘∈푅,푖∈푁
where 푓푘푖 denotes the amount received by agent 푖 on issue 푘. No agent can spend part of
the amount he receives for an issue on another issue. This approach is more popular in
many situations, for example, the ones mentioned above. It is followed in Lorenzo-Freire
푒푡 푎푙 [7], Moreno-Ternero [8], and Bergantin˜os 푒푡 푎푙 [1].
In this paper we follow Approach 2. We focus on the proportional rule (푃 ). Moreno-
Ternero [8] is the only study that follows Approach 2 devoted to 푃 in 푀퐼퐴 situations,
although he does not provide a characterization of 푃 in 푀퐼퐴 situations. Ju 푒푡 푎푙 [5] study
푃 in 푀퐼퐴 situations following Approach 1. They characterize 푃 generalizing the result
given by Chun [3] for 푃 for bankruptcy. We provide the ﬁrst characterization of 푃 using
properties adapted to 푀퐼퐴 situations. Our result also generalizes the characterization of
푃 for bankruptcy given by Chun [3].
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce 푀퐼퐴 situations. In
Section 3 we present our results.
2 Multi-issue allocation situations
In this section we introduce the model of bankruptcy and the proportional bankruptcy
rule. We then introduce multi-issue allocation situations.
A bankruptcy problem, O’Neill [9], is a triple (푁,퐸, 푐). 푁 = {1, . . . , 푛} is the set
of agents. The resource 퐸 ≥ 0 represents the amount to be divided among the agents,
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푐 = (푐푖)푖∈푁 ∈ ℝ푁+ and for each 푖 ∈ 푁 , 푐푖 denotes the claim of player 푖. It is assumed
that 0 ≤ 퐸 ≤
∑
푖∈푁
푐푖. A bankruptcy rule is a function 휓 which associates with each
bankruptcy problem (푁,퐸, 푐) a vector 휓(푁,퐸, 푐) ∈ ℝ푁 such that
∑
푖∈푁
휓푖(푁,퐸, 푐) = 퐸
and 0 ≤ 휓푖(푁,퐸, 푐) ≤ 푐푖 for each 푖 ∈ 푁 .
The proportional rule (푃 ) is deﬁned for each 푖 ∈ 푁 as 푃푖(푁,퐸, 푐) = 휆푐푖 where 휆 =
퐸∑
푗∈푁
푐푗
.
A multi-issue allocation (MIA) situation, Calleja 푒푡 푎푙 [2], is a 4-tuple (푅,푁,퐸,퐶).
Here, 푅 = {1, . . . , 푟} is the set of issues; 푁 = {1, . . . , 푛} is the set of agents; 퐸 ≥ 0 is the
amount of resource to be divided; for each 푖 ∈ 푁 and 푘 ∈ 푅, 푐푘푖 is the amount claimed by
player 푖 ∈ 푁 on issue 푘 ∈ 푅 and 퐶 = (푐푘푖)푘∈푅,푖∈푁 ∈ ℝ푅×푁+ . We assume 0 ≤ 퐸 ≤
∑
푘∈푅
∑
푖∈푁
푐푘푖.
Note that a bankruptcy situation is a MIA situation with ∣푅∣ = 1.
In order to deﬁne a rule, two approaches are possible. In the ﬁrst approach, a rule
assigns an amount to each agent (Calleja 푒푡 푎푙 [2], Gonza´lez-Alco´n 푒푡 푎푙 [4], and Ju 푒푡
푎푙 [5]). In the second approach, a rule assigns an amount to each agent and each issue
(Lorenzo-Freire 푒푡 푎푙 [7], Moreno-Ternero [8], and Bergantin˜os 푒푡 푎푙 [1]). We follow the
second approach.
A multi-issue allocation (MIA) rule 푓 is a function that associates with each MIA
situation (푅,푁,퐸,퐶) a matrix 푓(푅,푁,퐸,퐶) ∈ ℝ푅×푁 such that
∙ 0 ≤푓푘푖(푅,푁,퐸,퐶) ≤ 푐푘푖 for each 푘 ∈ 푅 and each 푖 ∈ 푁.
∙
∑
푘∈푅
∑
푖∈푁
푓푘푖(푅,푁,퐸,퐶) = 퐸.
3 The Proportional rule
Probably the most important rules in bankruptcy are the proportional (푃 ) rule, the con-
strained equal awards (퐶퐸퐴) rule, and the constrained equal losses (퐶퐸퐿) rule. The three
rules have been extended to 푀퐼퐴 situations. Lorenzo-Freire 푒푡 푎푙 [7] and Bergantin˜os 푒푡 푎푙
[1] give several characterizations of 퐶퐸퐴 and 퐶퐸퐿 using properties adapted to 푀퐼퐴 sit-
uations. In this section we provide the ﬁrst characterization of 푃 using properties adapted
to 푀퐼퐴 situations.
There exist two ways of extending 푃 from bankruptcy situations to 푀퐼퐴 situations.
We can use a two-stage procedure as in Lorenzo-Freire 푒푡 푎푙 [7]. We ﬁrst divide the
resource among the issues, following the proportional bankruptcy rule. Second, we di-
vide the amount assigned to each issue among the agents, following also the proportional
bankruptcy rule. The second way is a one-stage procedure. We also assign to each agent in
each issue, an amount proportional to the claim of the agent in the issue. Moreno-Ternero
[8] proves that the proportional rule is the unique bankruptcy rule such that the one-stage
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extension and the two-stage extension coincide. Thus, we deﬁne the proportional rule as
follows.
For each (푅,푁,퐸,퐶), each 푘 ∈ 푅, and each 푖 ∈ 푁 , 푃푘푖(푅,푁,퐸,퐶) = 휆푐푘푖 where
휆 =
퐸∑
푙∈푅
∑
푗∈푁
푐푙푗
.
Chun [3] introduces the property of non-advantageous transfer (푁퐴푇 ) in bankruptcy
situations. A rule 휓 satisﬁes 푁퐴푇 if for each (푁,퐸, 푐), (푁,퐸, 푐′) and 푀 ⊂ 푁 such that
푐푖 = 푐
′
푖 when 푖 ∈ 푁 ∖ 푀 and
∑
푖∈푀
푐푖 =
∑
푖∈푀
푐′푖, then
∑
푖∈푀
휓푖 (푁,퐸, 푐) =
∑
푖∈푀
휓푖 (푁,퐸, 푐
′).
Chun [3] proves that 푃 is the unique bankruptcy rule satisfying 푁퐴푇 . A stronger form
of this property, under the same hypotheses, states that 휓푖 (푁,퐸, 푐) = 휓푖 (푁,퐸, 푐
′) for all
푖 ∈ 푁 ∖푀 . Thus, 푁퐴푇 can be interpreted as follows. No group of agents 푆 can change
the amount received by any agent of 푁 ∖ 푆 by transferring claims among themselves.
Bergantin˜os 푒푡 푎푙 [1] extend several properties from bankruptcy situations to 푀퐼퐴
situations by invoking the properties twice. The property is ﬁrstly interpreted for the set
of issues and then for the agents within each issue. We apply the same idea to 푁퐴푇 .
Non-advantageous transfer across issues (푁퐴푇퐴). Let (푅,푁,퐸,퐶) and
(푅′, 푁 ′, 퐸 ′, 퐶 ′) be such that (푅,푁,퐸) = (푅′, 푁 ′, 퐸 ′) and 푆 ⊂ 푅 such that ∑
푘∈푆
(∑
푖∈푁
푐푘푖
)
=∑
푘∈푆
(∑
푖∈푁
푐′푘푖
)
and 푐푘푖 = 푐
′
푘푖 when (푘, 푖) ∈ 푅 ∖ 푆 ×푁 . Then, for each 푘 ∈ 푅 ∖ 푆,
∑
푖∈푁
푓푘푖(푅,푁,퐸,퐶) =
∑
푖∈푁
푓푘푖(푅,푁,퐸,퐶
′).
푁퐴푇퐴 implies that if the agents redistribute their claims among a group of issues,
then the amount assigned to each other issue does not change. For instance, the level
of total resources allocated to health care depends only on the total claim in health care(∑
푖∈푁
푐푘푖
)
and the aggregate claim on the rest of the issues
(∑
푙 ∕=푘
∑
푖∈푁
푐푙푖
)
, but it does not
depend on the way in which this aggregate claim is redistributed among the rest of the
issues.
Non-advantageous transfer within issues (푁퐴푇퐼). Let (푅,푁,퐸,퐶) and
(푅′, 푁 ′, 퐸 ′, 퐶 ′) be such that (푅,푁,퐸) = (푅′, 푁 ′, 퐸 ′), 푘 ∈ 푅, and푀 ⊂ 푁 , such that∑
푖∈푀
푐푘푖 =∑
푖∈푀
푐′푘푖 and 푐푙푖 = 푐
′
푙푖 when 푙 ∈ 푅 ∖ {푘} or 푖 ∈ 푁 ∖푀. Then, for each 푖 ∈ 푁 ∖푀 ,
푓푘푖(푅,푁,퐸,퐶) = 푓푘푖(푅,푁,퐸,퐶
′).
푁퐴푇퐼 says that if a group of agents redistribute their claims within an issue, then
the amount assigned to the other agents in this issue does not change. For instance, the
amount received by a local government 푖 in health care, provided that the claims of all
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agents in the rest of issues are the same, depends only on the local government’s claim in
health care (푐푘푖) and the aggregate claim of the other agents in health care
(∑
푗 ∕=푖
푐푘푗
)
, but
it does not depend in the way in which this aggregate claim in health care is redistributed
among the rest of the agents.
We now give a characterization of the proportional rule with 푁퐴푇퐴 and 푁퐴푇퐼.
Theorem 1. Let (푅,푁,퐸,퐶) be such that ∣푁 ∣ ≥ 3 and ∣푅∣ ≥ 3. Then, 푃 is the
unique rule satisfying 푁퐴푇퐴 and 푁퐴푇퐼.
Proof of Theorem 1. It is obvious that 푃 satisﬁes 푁퐴푇퐴 and 푁퐴푇퐼.
The uniqueness is a consequence of the following claims. We give a sketch of the proof.
Let 푓 be a rule satisfying 푁퐴푇퐼 and 푁퐴푇퐴.
Claim 1. Let 푞 = (푞푙푖)푙∈푅,푖∈푁 be such that for each 푙 ∈ 푅, (푞푙푖)푖∈푁 belongs to the
simplex in ℝ푁 . For each
(
푅,퐸, (푥푙)푙∈푅
)
we deﬁne 푓 푞 in such a way that for each 푘 ∈ 푅,
푓 푞푘
(
푅,퐸, (푥푙)푙∈푅
)
=
∑
푖∈푁
푓푘푖
(
푅,푁,퐸, (푞푙푖푥푙)푙∈푅,푖∈푁
)
.
Then, 푓 푞 = 푃.
Claim 2. For each 푘 ∈ 푅, ∑
푖∈푁
푓푘푖
(
푅,푁,퐸, (푐푙푖)푙∈푅,푖∈푁
)
=
∑
푖∈푁
푃푘푖
(
푅,푁,퐸, (푐푙푖)푙∈푅,푖∈푁
)
.
Claim 3. Let 푘 ∈ 푅 and 푑푘 = (푑푙푗)푙∈푅∖{푘},푗∈푁 ∈ ℝ푅∖{푘}×푁+ . For each
(
푁,퐸, (푦푗)푗∈푁
)
we deﬁne 푓푑
푘
in such a way that for each 푖 ∈ 푁
푓푑
푘
푖
(
푁,퐸, (푦푗)푗∈푁
)
= 푓푘푖
⎛⎜⎝푅,푁,
∑
푙∈푅,푗∈푁
푑푙푗∑
푗∈푁
푦푗
퐸, (푑푙푗)푙∈푅,푗∈푁
⎞⎟⎠
where 푑푘푗 = 푦푗 for all 푗 ∈ 푁 . Then, 푓푑푘 = 푃.
Claim 4. For each 푘 ∈ 푅 and 푖 ∈ 푁,
푓푘푖
(
푅,푁,퐸, (푐푙푗)푙∈푅,푗∈푁
)
= 푃푘푖
(
푅,푁,퐸, (푐푙푗)푗∈푅,푗∈푁
)
. ■
Remark 1. The properties used in Theorem 1 are independent. Lorenzo-Freire 푒푡 푎푙
[7] deﬁne a two-stage procedure to deﬁne 푀퐼퐴 rules from bankruptcy rules. They ﬁrst
apply a rule for dividing the resource among the issues. Later, the amount assigned to each
issue is divided among the agents by applying another rule. Note that this bankruptcy
rule can be diﬀerent from the ﬁrst one.
∙ The 푀퐼퐴 rule obtained by dividing among the issues with 퐶퐸퐴 and within each
issue with 푃 satisﬁes 푁퐴푇퐼 but fails 푁퐴푇퐴.
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∙ The 푀퐼퐴 rule obtained by dividing among the issues with 푃 and within each issue
with 퐶퐸퐴 satisﬁes 푁퐴푇퐴 but fails 푁퐴푇퐼.
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